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Reward probability crucially determines the value of outcomes. A basic phenomenon, defying explanation by traditional decision theo-
ries, is that people often overweigh small and underweigh large probabilities in choices under uncertainty. However, the neuronal basis
of such reward probability distortions and their position in the decision process are largely unknown.We assessed individual probability
distortions with behavioral pleasantness ratings and brain imaging in the absence of choice. Dorsolateral frontal cortex regions showed
experience dependent overweighting of small, and underweighting of large, probabilities whereas ventral frontal regions showed the
opposite pattern. These results demonstrate distorted neuronal coding of reward probabilities in the absence of choice, stress the
importance of experience with probabilistic outcomes and contrast with linear probability coding in the striatum. Input of the distorted
probability estimations to decision-makingmechanisms are likely to contribute towell known inconsistencies in preferences formalized
in theories of behavioral economics.
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Introduction
The probability of reward crucially determines the value of choice
options. Tomake optimal choices, traditional economic theories
suggest we should process probability linearly (Von Neumann
andMorgenstern, 1944; Pascal, 1948; Bernoulli, 1954). However,
the prevalence of behaviors such as gambling and buying insur-
ance suggests that we may not always process probability in a
linear manner. Instead, in these examples, we tend to give more
weight than objectively warranted to small probabilities (of win-
ning or an adverse event occurring) and less weight to large prob-
abilities (of losing or no adverse event occurring). Such subjective
deviations from objective probabilities are called “probability
distortions,” form a pervasive feature of human decisionmaking,
and build a cornerstone of modern economic theories, such as
prospect theory (Allais, 1953; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Lattimore et al., 1992; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992; Camerer andHo, 1994; Tversky andWak-
ker, 1995;Wu and Gonzalez, 1996;Wakker et al., 1997; Gonzalez
andWu, 1999; Abdellaoui, 2000; List andHaigh, 2005; Bleichrodt
and Eeckhout, 2006).
Probability distortions come in two patterns. Overweighting
of small ( P  0.3–0.4) and underweighting of large ( P  0.4)
probabilities reflect an inverted S-shaped pattern of distortion
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992;
Prelec, 1998). Inverted S-patterned distortions occur primarily
with verbal descriptions of probabilities not involving actual ex-
perience of outcomes. The second pattern concerns under-
weighting of small and overweighting of large probabilities, cor-
responds to regular S-shaped distortions, is relatively prevalent,
and becomes even more prevalent with increasing experience of
probabilistic outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Gigliotti
and Sopher, 1993; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Kareev et al., 2002;
Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004;
Weber, 2006).
A fundamental issue for understanding behavior involving
probabilistic outcomes concerns the stage of the decision process
at which probability distortions occur. An obvious possibility is
that distortions arise at actual choice stage, when people decide
between options with different reward probabilities (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). In this view, people estimate and represent
stated probabilities accurately but distortions becomemanifest at
the choice stagewhen the decisionmaker assigns decisionweights
to different options. An alternative, and not yet tested, possibility
would be that individuals already perceive probabilities in a non-
linear manner before any decision process is engaged. As a con-
sequence, probability distortionmight occur at an earlier period,
before decisions are actually made. Here we tested this possibility
with a simple stimulus-reward association task not requiring
overt choice.
A substantial body of evidence points to a role of lateral pre-
frontal cortex in processing probabilistic outcomes. This region is
active during probabilistic decision-making (Heekeren et al.,
2004, 2006). Lateral prefrontal neurons signal reward probabili-
ties (Kobayashi et al., 2002) and process reward and action in
stochastic situations (Barraclough et al., 2004). Ventral prefron-
tal regions process information that reflects the subjective expe-
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rience of events including rewarding out-
comes (Fuster, 1997; Duncan and Owen,
2000; Rolls, 2004). Given this, and given
that regular S distortions may be
experience-induced (Hertwig et al., 2004),
we hypothesize that activation in ventral
regions will show regular S distortions.
Conversely, dorsal prefrontal regions are
preferentially involved in cognitive and
evaluative functions (Fuster, 1997; Dun-
can and Owen, 2000; Rolls, 2004). In-
verted S distortions may represent a cog-
nitive response to abstractly presented,
rather than experienced, probabilities. We
therefore hypothesize that inverted S dis-
tortions will occur in dorsal prefrontal re-
gions. Given that different economic the-
ories employ linear or distorted
probability terms (Von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944; Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979) it is important to knowwhether
all neuronal probability signals are dis-
torted or whether some are linear. Previ-
ous research suggests linear reward proba-
bility coding in the striatum (Abler et al.,
2006; Preuschoff et al., 2006). Conversely,
individual differences in risk processing
seem to be expressed more in prefrontal
cortex than striatum (Tobler et al., 2007).
We therefore hypothesized a neuronal dis-
sociation between veridical and distorted
probability processing in the striatum and
prefrontal cortex, respectively.
Materials andMethods
Relation to prospect theory. Prospect theory assumes nonlinear distor-
tions both of probabilities and values. In contrast, traditional concepts
assume linear probability and linear or distorted value terms (e.g., ex-
pected utility as sum of probability weighted nonlinear, subjective, val-
ues; expected value as sum of probability weighted linear, objective, val-
ues). In the present context, we focus on distortion of probabilities rather
than values. Although we presently assume linear value coding and use
only two magnitude levels, this does not exclude nonlinear value repre-
sentation in prefrontal cortex or striatum. Also, the present study should
not be taken as an attempt to identify a neuronal correlate of prospect.
Rather, we focus on the potential requirement of overt choice for the
occurrence of probability distortions.
Participants.The individual participants, the basic design of the exper-
iments and the imaging techniques for recording the hemodynamic re-
sponse of reward regions were identical to those previously reported
(Tobler et al., 2007). Sixteen right-handed healthy participants (mean
age, 27 years; range, 20–41 years; eight females) were investigated. Par-
ticipants were preassessed to exclude previous histories of neurological
or psychiatric illness. All participants gave informed consent, and the
study was approved by the Joint Ethics Committee of the National Hos-
pital for Neurology and Neurosurgery (United Kingdom).
Behavioral procedure. To ensure that participants were aware of the
stated probabilities, we showed and explained the stimulus-probability
assignment before the start of the experiment and confirmed their un-
derstanding with basic questions. Participants were then placed on a
moveable bed in the scanner with light head restraint to limit headmove-
ment during image acquisition. Participants viewed a computermonitor
through amirror fitted on top of the head coil. To study the processing of
economic parameters regardless of choice, subjects performed in a sim-
ple conditioning paradigm in the scanner. At the beginning of a trial in
the main scanning paradigm, single visual stimuli appeared for 1.5 s in
one of the four quadrants of the monitor. Outcomes appeared 1 s after
the stimulus for 0.5 s below the stimulus on the monitor such that out-
come and stimulus presentation coterminated. Intertrial intervals varied
between 1 and 8 s according to a truncated Poisson distribution with a
mean of 3 s. To summarize, in each trial inside the scanner, participants
viewed a stimulus, indicated with a button press where the stimulus had
appeared, and viewed an outcome (Fig. 1a). In a separate behavioral
rating task performed outside the scanner before and after the experi-
ment, stimuli were presented randomly and participants rated each stim-
ulus on a scale from 5 (very pleasant) to 5 (very unpleasant). For the
rating task, outcomes were not shown.
In each trial inside the scanner, we randomly presented one of 12 visual
stimuli, each predicting reward with a specific magnitude and probabil-
ity. Ten of these 12 stimuli were of interest for the present work.We used
two levels of reward magnitude, 100 and 200 points, and five levels of
reward probability, which varied between p 0.0 and p 1.0 in steps of
0.25 (the two stimuli of no interest were 300 and 400 both at p 0.5). The
two levels ofmagnitude served to control for the effects ofmagnitude and
expected value. Both magnitude and expected value are twice as high at
200 compared with 100 points. Thus, at magnitude  100 points, ex-
pected values varied between 0 and 100 points, at magnitude  200
points, they varied between 0 and 200 points but probabilities were the
same in both conditions. If activations do not differ significantly between
the two magnitude levels, then the distortions are primarily driven by
probability rather thanmagnitude or expected value.However, the use of
only twomagnitude levels in the present design does not allow testing for
nonlinearities in the value function and future research is needed to
address this issue. The stimuli and the rewarded versus unrewarded out-
comes alternated randomly within the boundaries defined by the prob-
abilities (48 trials for p 1.0; e.g., 36 rewarded and 12 unrewarded trials
for p 0.75), thus producing ameasuredmean of reward identical to the
expected value. Throughout the experiment, the total points accumu-
lated were displayed and updated in rewarded trials at the time of reward
Figure 1. Experimental design and pleasantness ratings. a, Behavioral task. Single stimuli were presented randomly in one of
the four quadrants of a monitor for 1.5 s. Participants responded by indicating the quadrant in which stimuli appeared with a
button press. Stimuli were associated with different combinations of reward magnitude and probability. Reward consisted of
points, 4%ofwhichwere paid out as British pence to subjects at the end of the experiment. Throughout the experiment, the total
of points accumulatedwas displayed and updated after reward delivery. Trial types alternated randomly.b, Individual probability
weighting functions. To each participant’s rating data a linear in log odds weighting function (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999) was fit,
characterized by two parameters, one for curvature (gamma) and one for elevation (delta) of the probability-weighting function.
c, Average pleasantness rating for low and high gamma participants. Rating data were obtained at the end of the experiment
(error bars represent SEM). The scale ranged from5 (very unpleasant) to5 (very pleasant).
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delivery. Four percent of the total points were predictably paid out as
British pence at the end of the experiment.
The visual stimuli were specific combinations of attributes drawn
from two visual dimensions, shape and color, indicating reward magni-
tude and probability, respectively. For example, two orange circles could
predict 200 points with p 0.5, whereas one dark red circle could predict
100 points with p  1.0. Both stimuli were associated with different
combinations of magnitude and probability but the same expected value
(100 points). We counterbalanced the meaning of dimensions (shape or
color of stimuli) and the direction in which they changed (for shape,
number of circles per stimulus; for color, relative level of yellow or red)
across participants. Stimulus delivery was controlled using Cogent 2000
software (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London,
United Kingdom) as implemented in Matlab 6.5 (Mathworks).
The conditioning procedure comprised a training and a testing phase.
In the training phase, participants learned themeaning of the stimuli and
how to perform the task while each stimulus was presented in eight
consecutive trials. Earnings in the training phase did not contribute to
themonetary earnings of participants, but accumulated points were nev-
ertheless displayed. Participants were in the scanner during the training
phasewhile structural scanswere taken. Functional datawere acquired in
the test phase, split into two halves, each with 24 randomly alternating
presentations of each stimulus. The task remained the same as during the
training phase, but outcomes contributed to total earnings. In both train-
ing and testing phase, stimuli appeared in one of the four quadrants of the
screen. The quadrant of stimulus appearance varied randomly between
trials. Participants were instructed to press one of four buttons corre-
sponding to the spatial quadrant of stimulus presentation. If they failed
to press the correct button within 900ms, the trial was aborted, a red “X”
appeared, and 100 points were subtracted from the accumulated earn-
ings. Error trials were repeated, and reported results correspond to cor-
rect trials in the testing phase.
Data acquisition and analysis.Weevaluated ratings statistically by non-
parametric Spearman and Kendall rank correlation, thus allowing for
nonlinear changes as a function of probability. The proportion of partic-
ipants showing positive or negative correlation with probability was ex-
amined with a one-sample rank test.
We fitted a log in odds function to each participant’s rating data from
after scanning, averaged across the two magnitudes (Gonzalez and Wu,
1999). As we tested the full probability spectrum only with two magni-
tudes, we did not estimate the curvature of the value function. The log in
odds function captures the probability weighting functionw( p) of pros-
pect theory with two parameters:
log
wp
1 wp
 log p1 p .
Solving for w( p) yields the following:
w p 
p
p  1  p
with  exp .
In this version of the probability weighting function,  primarily re-
flects the curvature of the weighting function whereas  reflects its eleva-
tion. For each participant the best-fitting  and were obtained and used
for correlations with neuronal probability distortions. For the three par-
ticipants with negative correlations between ratings and probability, the
fits yielded negative parameters and these participants were excluded
from the correlation analysis. The reasons for the negative correlations
are unclear. One possibility is that the participants’ visual preferences
changed independently of reward associations and ratings in these par-
ticipants were driven by visual preferences. The results reported in the
remaining analyses remained significant when these three participants
were excluded.We also tested preference of participants for higher prob-
ability among two concurrently presented stimuli before and after the
experiment.
We acquired gradient echo T2*-weighted echo-planar images (EPIs)
with blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) contrast on a Siemens So-
nata 1.5 Tesla scanner (slices/volume, 33; repetition time, 2.97 s). De-
pending on performance of participants, 405–500 volumes were col-
lected in each half of the experiment, together with five “dummy”
volumes at the start of each scanning run. Scan onset times varied ran-
domly relative to stimulus onset times. A T1-weighted structural image
was also acquired for each participant. Signal dropout in basal frontal and
medial temporal structures resulting from susceptibility artifact was re-
duced by using a tilted plane of acquisition (30° to the anterior
commissure-posterior commissure line, rostral  caudal). Imaging pa-
rameters were the following: echo time, 50 ms; field-of-view, 192 mm.
The in-plane resolutionwas 3 3mm,with a slice thickness of 2mmand
an interslice gap of 1 mm. High-resolution T1-weighted structural scans
were coregistered to their mean EPIs and averaged together to permit
anatomical localization of the functional activations at the group level.
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM2; Functional Imaging Labora-
tory) served to spatially realign functional data, normalize them to a
standard EPI template and smooth them using an isometric Gaussian
kernel with a full-width at half-maximum of 10mm.We used a standard
rapid event-related fMRI approach in which evoked hemodynamic re-
sponses to each trial type are estimated separately by convolving a canon-
ical hemodynamic response function with the onsets for each trial type
and regressing these trial regressors against the measured fMRI signal
(Dale and Buckner, 1997; Josephs and Henson, 1999). This approach
makes use of the fact that the hemodynamic response function summates
in an approximately linear manner over time (Boynton et al., 1996). By
presenting trials in strictly random order and using randomly varying
intertrial intervals, it is possible to separate out fMRI responses to rapidly
presented eventswithoutwaiting for the hemodynamic response to reach
baseline after each single trial (Dale and Buckner, 1997; Josephs and
Henson, 1999). Functional data were analyzed by constructing a set of
stick functions at the stimulus-onset times for each of the 12 trial types in
a first model and at outcome-onset times in a second model. Rewarded
and unrewarded trial types were modeled separately. The stick function
regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function (HRF). Participant-specific movement parameters were mod-
eled as covariates of no interest.
The general linear model served to compute trial type-specific betas,
reflecting the strength of covariance between the brain activation and the
canonical response function for a given condition at each voxel for each
participant (Friston et al., 1995). We parsed the entire probability range
into four quartiles. To test for an inverted S-shaped probability distor-
tion in the brain, we constructed the following contrast: [( p 1.0 p
0.75) ( p 0.25 p 0.0)] ( p 0.75 p 0.25). This contrast
reflects the critical property of the inverted S-shaped function that it
increases more in the top and the bottom quartile of the probability
range. Conversely, S-shaped probability distortions were tested for with
the following contrast: ( p 0.75 p 0.25) [( p 1.0 p 0.75)
 ( p  0.25  p  0.0)], reflecting the basic property of the S-shaped
function with stronger increases in the middle range of the probability
range. The effects of interest (betas, percentage of signal change) were
calculated relative to an implicit baseline. Using random-effects analysis,
the relevant contrasts of parameter estimates (contrast estimates) were
entered into a series of t tests, simple regressions or ANOVAs with non-
sphericity correction where appropriate. We used whole-brain correc-
tion for multiple comparisons [ P 0.05; false discovery rate; through-
out, statistical probability (P) is distinguished from reward probability
(p) by case]. Reported voxels conform to MNI (Montreal Neurological
Institute) coordinate space, with the right side of the image correspond-
ing to the right side of the brain.
Results
The goal of this study was to identify the neuronal basis of non-
linear probability processing (probability distortions) in the pre-
frontal cortex by using functionalmagnetic resonance imaging in
a simple stimulus-reward association task without choice (Fig.
1a) (Materials and Methods). Specifically, we asked whether
probability distortions in a typical decision brain structure are a
result of the decision process or might already occur at earlier
stages. The design used the full range of reward probabilities and
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experienced outcomes. Different stimuli
predicted different all-or-none binary
probability distributions of reward which
varied between p 0.0 and p 1.0 in five
levels separated by 0.25. Participants
viewed one reward-predicting stimulus
per trial, experienced outcomes in each
trial and learned the probabilities associ-
ated with each stimulus before scanning.
Behavior
We tested preference of participants for
higher probability among two concur-
rently presented stimuli before, and after,
the experiment. After the experiment, par-
ticipants consistently preferred higher
probability to lower probability stimuli.
For example, 14 of 16 participants pre-
ferred the stimulus predicting 100 points
with p  1.0 over the stimulus predicting
100 points with p  0.0 ( p  0.004, one
sample sign test). Thirteen of 16 partici-
pants preferred 200 points at p 0.75 over
200 points at p  0.25 ( p  0.02). Con-
versely, there were no significant differ-
ences in preference between the stimuli predicting reward at dif-
ferent probabilities before the experiment [p 0.45 for p(100)
1.0 vs p(100)  0.0 and p  0.80 for p(200)  0.75 vs p(200)
0.25]. These data suggest that participants’ preferences became sen-
sitive to variations in probability as a result of the experimental con-
ditioning procedure.
Wemeasured the pleasantness of stimuli before and after con-
ditioning. Pleasantness ratings did not vary as a function of prob-
ability before but increased with increasing probability after con-
ditioning (before conditioning: median Spearman’s r across
participants 0.22; and Kendall’s tau 0.16; after conditioning:
Spearman’s r and Kendall’s tau of median ratings 1, P 0.05;
median Spearman’s r across participants 0.94; Kendall’s tau
0.88;). After conditioning, the pleasantness ratings of 13participants
correlated positively with probability, those of the remaining 3 neg-
atively ( p0.02, one sample sign test;p0.3before conditioning).
Thus, pleasantness ratings became sensitive to variations in proba-
bility as a result of the conditioning procedure.
Modern economic theories capture the shape of nonlinear
patterns of probability processing formally by probability-
weighting functions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Gonzalez
and Wu, 1999). These weighting functions determine the degree
to which our probability estimations deviate from linearity with
curvature and other parameters. To assess individual distortions
in pleasantness ratings we fitted a two-parameter probability
weighting function (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999) to each partici-
pant’s ratings (after conditioning, averaged across the two mag-
nitudes). The two parameters used by this specific weighting
function capture the curvature () and the elevation () of the
probability-weighting curve (supplemental Fig. S1, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). The obtained
probability weighting functions showed individual variation in 
and  (Fig. 1b). Importantly, low  values reflected overrating of
small probabilities and underrating of large probabilities whereas
high  values reflected the opposite pattern. Thus, low and high 
values correspond to inverted S and regular S shape probability
distortion curves, respectively. Participants’ ratings showed both
patterns of probability distortion (Fig. 1c). Gamma and delta
varied independently from each other (supplemental Fig. S2,
available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). Re-
gardless of curvature, high  participants rated probabilities
smaller than p  1.0 higher compared with low  participants
(supplemental Fig. S2, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material).
BOLD responses
To search for neuronal distortions in probability processing, we
initially looked for inverted S and regular S-shaped probability
distortions together in a two-tailed analysis. All the results re-
ported subsequently were significant in this two-tailed test ( P
0.05, whole-brain correction). We then specifically identified
brain regions showing probability distortions captured by an in-
verted S-shape in all participants, regardless of individual proba-
bility distortions. An inverted S probability-weighting function
results in the weights of p  0.25 and p  0.75 being relatively
closer together than the weight of p 0.25 from that of p 0.0
(overweighting of small probability) and the weight of p  0.75
from that of p  1.0 (underweighting of large probability). Ac-
cordingly, we used a contrast that tested for stronger activation
changes in the bottom and top quartiles of the probability range
compared with the two center quartiles. We found a highly sig-
nificant covariation betweenmodeled and actual brain activation
in a region of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fig. 2a) (z 4.9;P
0.05, whole-brain correction). This was the only region for which
effects were significant with whole-brain correction.
When evaluating the signal change in this region in greater
detail we found a strong activity increase from p 0.0 to p 0.25,
consistent with overweighting of small probabilities, and a simi-
larly strong activity decrease between p 1.0 and p 0.75, con-
sistent with underweighting of large probabilities (Fig. 2b). To
test whether the distortions were related to magnitude or ex-
pected value we compared the activations for 100 and 200 points
separately at each level of probability. Both magnitude and ex-
pected value are twice as high at 200 compared with 100 points.
Thus, atmagnitude 100 points, expected values varied between
0 and 100 points, atmagnitude 200 points, they varied between
0 and 200 points but probabilities were the same and varied be-
Figure 2. Neuronal probability distortion corresponding to an inverted S-shaped function. a, Activation in dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex covarying with an inverted S-shaped probability weighting function (peak at32/16/34; whole-brain correction;
z 4.9). An inverted S-shaped activation was tested by comparing activation increases from p 0.0 to p 0.25 and p 0.75
to p 1.0 against increases from p 0.25 to p 0.75. Activation corresponded significantly better with distorted than linear
probability coding ( P 0.05). b, Averaged signal change as a function of probability at peak voxel shown in a. Activation is
averaged over two levels of magnitude (100 and 200 points) and over rewarded and unrewarded trials (supplemental Fig. S3,
available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material, for separate analysis). Activation at p 0.5 is not connected with
activation at p 0.25 and p 0.75 because it was not used in the critical contrast. Error bars correspond to SEM. c, Relation of
dorsolateral prefrontal probability distortion to individual behavioral probability distortion at peak voxel shown ina. The contrast
estimates (betas) reflecting the degree of neuronal inverted S curvature of individual participants were regressed against the
curvatureparameter of theprobability-weighting function (gamma)Abscissa showsbehavioral curvatureas expressedbygamma
(gamma1, overweighting of small, underweighting of large probabilities, hence the negative correlation; gamma1 under-
weighting of small, overweighting of large probabilities). We first determined for each participant the contrast estimates (betas)
reflecting the goodness of fit between the brain activations and the inverted S-shaped-related activations.We then regressed the
obtained contrast estimates (betas) of all participants to their individual curvature factors assessed behaviorally.
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tween p 0.0 and p 1.0 in both conditions. We found similar
distortions and no significant activation differences between the
two magnitude levels (supplemental Fig. S3a, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material) ( P 0.05). The similar-
ity and overlap of activation distortions at different magnitude
levels suggests that reward magnitude or value did not play a
major role in the generation of the observed results. Rather, dis-
torted activations appear to be primarily driven by probability.
To assess whether stimulus-related activations were con-
founded by outcome-related activationswe plotted rewarded and
unrewarded trials separately (although there were no unre-
warded trials at p  1.0 and no rewarded trials at p  0.0).
Activations at intermediate probabilities were similar for re-
warded and unrewarded trials, suggesting that these responses
were due more to conditioned stimuli rather than outcomes
(supplemental Fig. S3b, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material). Thus, activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex follows an inverted S-shape as suggested by prospect the-
ory, but, importantly, this neuronal distortion of probability oc-
curs even in the absence of behavioral choice.
The neuronal probability distortions reported thus far oc-
curred when considering all participants, regardless of behavior.
We reasoned that a brain region that encodes reward probability
in a distorted manner should also be sensitive to behavioral dis-
tortions of individual participants. This was indeed the case. The
more the individual probability-weighting functions followed an
inverted S (corresponding to low ) (Fig. 1b), the better the re-
gression of brain activation with an inverted S-shape in the dor-
solateral prefrontal region in each individual (Fig. 2c) (r0.73;
p  0.003). We used two different nonparametric, rank-
dependentmethods to test whether the correlations between pre-
frontal activation and subjective probability weighting were
outlier-resistant. Both methods revealed a significant correlation
(Fig. 2c) (Spearman’s r0.61; p 0.03; Kendall’s tau0.46;
p  0.03). The correlations occurred only for the distortion pa-
rameter  of the probability weighting function, but not for the
elevation parameter,  (supplemental Figs. S4, S5 for further con-
trols, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
These data suggest that coding of neuronal probability distor-
tions can explain the magnitude of subjective behavioral distor-
tions; individuals showing stronger neuronal overweighting of
small and underweighting of large probabilities also showed sim-
ilarly stronger behavioral over- and underweighting. The corre-
lations with individual behavior in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
occur in addition to the behavior-independent overweighting of
small and underweighting of large proba-
bilities in the same region described above.
Consistent with previous reports
(Gigliotti and Sopher, 1993; Harbaugh et
al., 2002), our behavioral results indicated
that not all individuals weighted probabil-
ities according to an inverted S-shaped
function. Instead, some used a regular
S-shaped function, corresponding to un-
derweighting of small and overweighting
of large probabilities (Fig. 1b). To identify
regions showing S-shaped neuronal prob-
ability distortions in all participants, re-
gardless of behavior, we used a contrast
that tested for greater activation increases
in the two center quartiles of the probabil-
ity range compared with the bottom and
the top quartiles.We found four regions in
prefrontal cortex that survived whole-brain correction for mul-
tiple comparisons (supplemental Table S1, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material). All regions showed sim-
ilar activation patterns. A representative ventrolateral prefrontal
region is shown in Figure 3a. Activation in this region increased
marginally from p 0.0 to p 0.25 and from p 0.75 to p 1.0
but considerably from p 0.25 to p 0.75 (Fig. 3b). This pattern
of activation corresponds to neuronal underweighting of small
and overweighting of large probabilities. There were no signifi-
cant activation differences between low and high levels of mag-
nitude and between rewarded and unrewarded trials (supple-
mental Fig. S6, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material). Importantly, the regular S-shaped distortions oc-
curred in the absence of choice, and when testing all participants,
regardless of their behavior.
We next asked whether ventrolateral prefrontal activation
correlated with individual behavioral probability distortion and
found that indeed it did. Furthermore, correlations were outlier-
resistant. Individuals with more extreme S-shaped probability-
weighting functions (high ) also showed stronger S-shaped ac-
tivation in the ventrolateral prefrontal region (Fig. 3c) (r 0.72;
p 0.004; Spearman’s r 0.69; P 0.02; Kendall’s tau 0.51;
P  0.01). There was no correlation between activity in this re-
gion and the elevation parameter  (supplemental Fig. S7, avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Recent studies showed that the shape of probability distor-
tions depends on whether probabilistic outcomes are actually
experienced or hypothetically described (Kareev et al., 2002; Bar-
ron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004;
Weber, 2006). Based on these suggestions we investigated the
influence of experience on the shape of the probability-weighting
function.We compared the first with the second half of the scan-
ning trials, when participants’ experience with the probabilistic
outcomes of the task had increased. Indeed we found that the
activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal region described in Figure 2
fitted an inverted S-shape better in the first than in the secondhalf
of the experiment (Fig. 4a, left) (F  16.3, p  0.002, repeated
measures ANOVA). Conversely, activity in the ventrolateral pre-
frontal regions shown in Figure 3 was well captured by an
S-shaped regressor in both the first and the second half of the
experiment (Fig. 4a, right) (F 0.46, p 0.51) and, if anything,
the fit of the activation with the regressor increased with experi-
ence. A significant region by experience interaction was obtained
for dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (F 4.9, p
0.03). These data suggest that increasing behavioral experience
Figure 3. Neuronal probability distortion corresponding to an S-shaped function. a, Activation in ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex covarying with an S-shaped probability weighting function (peak at 54/32/14; whole-brain correction; z 3.6) (supple-
mental Table S1, for further regions, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). An S-shaped activation profile
was testedby comparingactivation increases fromp0.25 top0.75against increases fromp0.0 top0.25andp0.75
to p 1.0. Activation corresponded significantly better with distorted than linear probability coding ( P 0.05). b, Averaged
signal changes as a function of probability at peak voxel shown in a. Error bars correspond to SEM. c, Relation of ventrolateral
frontal probability distortion to individual behavioral probability distortion at peak voxel shown in a. See Figure 2c for further
explanations.
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with probabilistic outcomes preferentially straightens inverted
S-shaped rather than regular S-shaped neuronal probability
distortions.
The preferential fit of dorsolateral prefrontal activation to an
inverted S-shape distortion in the first compared with the second
half of the experiment could result from a general decrease in
dorsolateral prefrontal responsiveness to probability with in-
creasing experience, i.e., a reduced probability-response slope.
We therefore compared the fit to a linear probability function
between the two successive halves of the experiment. Contrary to
reduced responsiveness, and in agreement with a reduction in
inverted S-shape processing, we found a significant fit in dorso-
lateral prefrontal activation with linear probability in the second
half of the experiment ( P 0.05), which was significantly better
than in the first half (F  9.0, P  0.01). Thus, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex remained responsive to reward probability with
continued task experience but probability coding became more
linear.
To investigate the mechanism by which experience changes
the shape of the neuronal probability distortion, we reasoned that
the surprising occurrence of reward or no reward might provide
an occasion for learning, as suggested by formal learning theory
(Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975). The essence of
reward learning, as captured by formal learning theories, is to
adjust predictions of reward according to the differences between
what we have learned so far and what we currently experience in
terms of reward outcomes (prediction errors). The inverted
S-shape distortions of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex correspond
to an overprediction of reward for low probability and underpre-
diction of reward for high probability stimuli. Undistortion of an
inverted S-shape can be induced by strong prediction error re-
sponses from the experienced omission of reward after low prob-
ability and from experienced reward occurrence after high prob-
ability stimuli. This response pattern should be expressed in the
first half of the experiment, when probability representations are
still more distorted in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex compared
with the second half of the experiment. We analyzed outcome
responses in a separate general linear model and found stronger
dorsolateral prefrontal activation to reward absence in the first
than the second half of the experimentwith p 0.25 (Fig. 4b, left)
(F  9.7, P  0.008, repeated measures ANOVA). Conversely,
responses to reward delivery were stronger in the first than the
second half of the experiment with p 0.75 (Fig. 4b, right) (F
17.9, P 0.001). Accordingly, there was a significant interaction
of condition, outcome and experiment half in dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (F  4.9, P  0.03). These data suggest that the
outcome responses in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may corre-
spond to reward prediction errors, which develop over the course
of the experiment. Such development of prediction error coding
may in turn contribute to undistorting neuronal representations
of reward probability by experience.
The decrease in dorsolateral activation to reward omission
with p  0.25 and reward delivery with p  0.75 could reflect a
general decline in responding to outcomes with increasing expe-
rience. To test for this possibility we analyzed activations induced
by the complimentary outcomes (reward delivery with p 0.25
and reward omission with p  0.75). For these outcomes, there
were no significant differences between the two halves of the
experiment (reward delivery at p 0.25, p 0.13; reward omis-
sion at p 0.75, p 0.96), indicating that there was no evidence
of a change in responsiveness. The significant outcome related
activations at p 0.5 remained unchanged between the first and
second half of the experiment (reward delivery, p 0.13; reward
omission, p 0.59), compatible with unchanged processing and
prediction error coding at p  0.5. These data suggest that out-
come response reductions at p  0.25 (rewarded) and p  0.75
(unrewarded) are not indicative of a general decrement in re-
sponsiveness with increasing experience in dorsolateral prefron-
tal cortex.
In a final step, we investigated whether there would be regions
that code probability in a nondistorted manner or regions that
showed a threshold effect by responding only to high probabili-
ties. We used a regression model that tested for linear increases
with probability and found a significant covariation between
modeled and actual responses in the striatum (Fig. 5a,b). The fit
was significantly better with the linear than with the distorted
contrasts ( P  0.05). The probability-related striatal activation
increases did not correlatewith behavioral probability distortions
(Fig. 5c). Thus, activity in the striatum increases linearly with
probability in the absence of choice. At the chosen threshold
( P  0.05, whole-brain corrected), there were no regions that
showed a threshold effect by responding exclusively to p  0.75
or p 1.0.
Discussion
This study provides evidence for neuronal distortions of reward
probabilities in prefrontal cortex and veridical reward probability
Figure 4. Change of neuronal probability distortions as a function of experience. a, Left,
Decrease of fit of activation to regressor testing for inverted S-shaped function in first and
second half of the experiment ( P 0.05, small volume correction in cluster identified for Fig.
2). Peak of differential activationwas at32/14/36, in immediate vicinity to peak voxel shown
in Figure 2a. a, Right, No change of fit of activation to regressor testing for regular S-shaped
probability-weighting function with experience at peak voxel shown in Figure 3a. For this
figure, inverted S-shaped and S-shaped activationwere defined as described in Figures 2 and 3,
respectively.b, Left, Differential activationbetween first and secondhalf of experiment induced
by omission of reward at p 0.25 ( P 0.05, small volume correction). b, Right, Differential
activation between first and second half of experiment induced by delivery of reward at p
0.75 ( P 0.05, small volume correction). For b, peak of differential activation was at32/
16/34, samevoxel as shown in Figure 2a. Therewereno significant differences between the first
and secondhalf of the experiment in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for delivery of reward atp
0.25 and omission of reward at p 0.75, and for all comparisons in ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (peak voxel of Fig. 3a; all P 0.1). In this figure, response plots correspond to average
contrast estimates, error bars to 90% confidence intervals.
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processing in the striatum. The specific distortion pattern pro-
posed by prospect theory, with overweighting of small and un-
derweighting of large probabilities, is expressed in the activity of
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Conversely, underweighting of
small and overweighting of large probabilities is expressed in
ventral parts of the prefrontal cortex. Both of these effects occur
when all individuals are tested, regardless of behavior. Prospect
theory uses probability distortions to explain preference reversals
(Allais-paradox) (Allais, 1953) when people choose between high
or low probability options (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). A
combined underweighting of large and overweighting of small
probabilities by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex could provide
an anatomical basis for such preference reversals.
Our procedure differed from standard procedures of behav-
ioral economics in that we used conditioning rather than choice,
visual rather than alphanumeric stimuli, immediate rather than
no or delayed feedback and repeated experience rather than hy-
pothetical descriptions. We deliberately avoided choice situa-
tions to study the input stage of the choice process. It remains to
be seen whether the distortions also occur with overt choices
between feedback-free numeric options or whether they are spe-
cific to our behavioral situation.
Our results concur with the notion that people differ in how
exactly their probability processing deviates from linearity. We
found a relatively high proportion of individuals showing
experience-compatible regular S-distortions rather than
description-compatible inverted S-distortions. However, behav-
ior reflecting regular S-distortions is not uncommon even with
hypothetical decisions in the absence of experience with proba-
bilistic outcomes (e.g., 17–28% in Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Gigliotti and Sopher, 1993; Harbaugh et al., 2002). The relatively
high proportion of regular S-distortions and substantial experi-
encewith probabilistic outcomes in our study agreeswell with the
observation that increasing experience increases the propensity
of regular S-distortions (Kareev et al., 2002; Barron and Erev,
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004; Weber, 2006).
Previous neuroimaging research showed that prefrontal re-
gions are activated by reward magnitude (Knutson et al., 2005;
Yacubian et al., 2006). The absence of significant activation dif-
ferences between the two levels of magnitude used here suggests
that the observed distortions were primarily driven by reward
probability rather than magnitude (see supplemental discussion,
available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material, for re-
lation of present work to previous studies of probability distor-
tion (Paulus and Frank, 2006; Berns et al., 2008) and to lesion
studies (Bechara et al., 2000; Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Clark et
al., 2004; Hornak et al., 2004; Fellows and
Farah, 2005; Floden et al., 2008).
Distortions in brain responses to prob-
ability emerged presently with a direct test
(contrast) for such distortions in event-
related brain activation to reward-
predicting stimuli. Thus, our results oc-
curred regardless of our behavioral
definition of probability distortion. Only
in a second step did we search for correla-
tions of activation distortions with indi-
vidual differences in pleasantness ratings.
The presence of correlations in the same
regions identified with the direct test may
suggest that differences in pleasantness
ratings indeed captured differences in
probability distortions. An alternative in-
terpretation would be that activations reflect encoding of specific
visual stimuli for future recall. However, we varied the assign-
ment of visual stimuli to probability conditions across partici-
pants, and we found no significant activations in typical visual
memory encoding structures such as left ventrolateral prefrontal
and temporal cortex (Wagner et al., 1999; Prince et al., 2005).
Moreover, the differential effect of experience on inverted S and
regular S-distortions is difficult to reconcile with a recall of spe-
cific visual inputs account but fits well with previous behavioral
research on probability distortion (Hertwig et al., 2004;Weber et
al., 2004).
The present results are fully compatible with the possibility
that participants encoded reward probability, possibly for future
use. In this view, the encoding or generation of decision variables
such as probability could follow principles proposed by learning
theory. Encoding of decision variables could consist of integra-
tion over a series of positive and negative prediction errors and
assignment of the ensuing value to predictive stimuli (Rescorla
and Wagner, 1972). Experience and memory factors may then
lead to the distortion of probability. For example, recent experi-
encesmay receivemoreweight than less recent experiences (Hog-
arth and Einhorn, 1992). Because low probability outcomes are
rare, they are less likely to have occurred recently than more
probable events. Thus, underweighting of small probabilities
may result from recency effects (Hertwig et al., 2004). For trans-
lation into decision making during overt choices, some of these
decision variables may be combined, e.g., reward probability and
magnitude. Such combinations could then be ordered for the
various choice options to allow choice of the option with the
highest objective or subjective value.
Our results both endorse a prediction and learning-based ac-
count of probability distortions as well as expand on previous
work implicating prefrontal cortex in learning (Bichot et al.,
1996; Rushworth et al., 1997; Assad et al., 1998; Gehring and
Knight, 2000; Corlett et al., 2004). The inverted S-distortion in
dorsolateral prefrontal activation is consistent with reward over-
prediction for low andunderprediction for high probability stim-
uli. Learning theories suggest that we learn about rewards when-
ever our predictions fail to match outcomes (prediction error;
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Mackintosh, 1975). In agreement
with this idea, dorsolateral prefrontal activation decreased with
experience specifically to reward omission after low probability
stimuli and to reward delivery after high probability stimuli.
Thus, our findings point to a role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
in outcome-driven plasticity of probability-weighting functions.
The current study elucidates further a role for prefrontal cor-
Figure 5. Independence of neuronal probability coding in striatum from behavioral probability distortion. a, Activation in
striatumshowing linear activation increaseswith increasingprobabilities. Activation corresponded significantly betterwith linear
than distorted probability coding ( P 0.05; peak at10/4/4).b, Averaged signal change as a function of probability at peak
voxel shown in a. Error bars correspond to SEM. c, Absence of relation of linear probability coding and behavioral curvature
(gamma) in striatal voxel shown in a (r 0.16; p 0.60; Spearman’s r 0.18; p 0.53; Kendall’s tau 0.10; p 0.63).
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tex in decision-making by revealing neuronal probability distor-
tions without overt choice. In tasks not requiring choice activity
of lateral prefrontal neurons codes reward quality and probability
and shows a preferential relation to reward rather than punish-
ment (Watanabe, 1996; Kobayashi et al., 2002, 2006). Although
prefrontal neurons are also active in choice situations (Kim and
Shadlen, 1999; Barraclough et al., 2004), it is currently unknown
whether this activity is specifically choice-related. Together, the
data suggest a major role of lateral prefrontal cortex in coding
fundamental reward decision variables.
Neuroimaging research suggests a substantial involvement of
the left superior frontal sulcus in perceptual decisions (Heekeren
et al., 2004, 2006). Here, we show that a region in close proximity
to that lateral prefrontal region showed inverted S-distortions of
reward probability [peak activation in Heekeren et al. (2004):
24/24/36; peak here: 32/16/34]. It is essential for a decision
structure to have access to such a fundamental reward parameter
as probability. Our results suggest the intriguing possibility that
decisions performed by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex could be
biased by a reward probability signal that overemphasizes small
and underemphasizes large probabilities.
Inverted S-distortions may reflect primarily a cognitive re-
sponse to verbal descriptions of probability, whereas regular
S-distortions arise from probabilistic experience with affective
outcomes (Kareev et al., 2002; Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et
al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004; Weber, 2006). Dissociations of cog-
nitive and affective processesmaponto dorsal and ventral parts of
prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 1997; Duncan and Owen, 2000). Fur-
thermore, ventral regions receive relatively stronger sensory in-
puts than dorsal regions (Pandya and Yeterian, 1998). The find-
ing of inverted S-coding in dorsolateral, and regular S-coding in
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, reflects this dorsal-ventral
scheme of prefrontal organization.
The current results suggest that lateral prefrontal cortex is partic-
ularly sensitive to experienced reward. Peopleusually infer probabil-
ities fromrepeatedexperience.The lateralprefrontal cortexmightbe
well suited to do so because of its representation of previous deci-
sions and outcomes (Barraclough et al., 2004). Conversely, reward
magnitude and delay become apparent with less experience and are
processed preferentially by more medial and orbitofrontal regions
(Wallis andMiller, 2003; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Roesch
et al., 2006; Rudebeck et al., 2006). The lateral prefrontal cortex is
also particularly sensitive to individual differences in the processing
of ambiguity (Huettel et al., 2006) and probability (present). Con-
versely, ventromedial regions aremore sensitive to individual differ-
ences in delay processing (Kable andGlimcher, 2007). Together, the
present and previous data suggest the intriguing possibility of
medio-lateral dissociations in prefrontal processing of economic
decision parameters.
The distorted probability signals we report in prefrontal cor-
tex contrasted with linear signals in the striatum. Thus, the cur-
rent data confirm and extend previous reports of linear probabil-
ity processing in the striatum (Abler et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al.,
2006; Tobler et al., 2007). The linear probability signals in the
striatum did not correlate with behavioral probability distor-
tions, whereas the distorted prefrontal signals did. Individual dif-
ferences in ambiguity and risk attitude seem to be expressed pri-
marily in prefrontal rather than striatal activity (Huettel et al.,
2006; Tobler et al., 2007). Together, these data suggest that the
striatum showsmore veridicality and less sensitivity to individual
differences than the prefrontal cortex when processing reward
probability.
The co-occurrence of linear and distorted probability signals
in the brain has theoretical relevance. To determine the value of
choice options, traditional economic concepts (expected utility
and expected value) employ linear probability terms whereas
more recent concepts (prospect) employ a distorted probability
term (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) (see Materials and Methods). Thus, the data sug-
gest that the linear striatal probability coding could form the basis
of expected utility or expected value signals whereas the distorted
dorsolateral prefrontal coding could form the basis of prospect-
like signals.
Sensory illusions could pose an analogy with behavioral pref-
erence reversals because subjective behavior fails to reflect objec-
tive inputs in both cases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Sensory
illusions and preference reversals could arise from distortions in
visual information and reward probability processing, respec-
tively. As with sensory illusions (Chen et al., 2003; Jazayeri and
Movshon, 2007), our results suggest that reward probability dis-
tortions can occur at different processing stages. In this scheme,
the striatum would correspond more to the retina with veridical
probability coding whereas prefrontal cortex would correspond
more to higher-order sensory regions with distorted signals. The
fact that signals in the striatum encode probability linearly sug-
gests that the incorporation of distortions occurs downstream of
the divergence of pathways leading to the striatum and prefrontal
cortex (including in the prefrontal cortex itself). Nonetheless, it is
possible thatmore sensory regionsmay process or store distorted
information as well, as is the case with contextual visual illusions
(Murray et al., 2006). More importantly, by revealing neuronal
probability distortions at a neuronal encoding stage of processing
before actual choice behavior, the present data show how neuro-
imaging data inform and expand predictions derived from be-
havioral theory.
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Supplementary discussion 
 
Relation to previous studies on probability distortion 
The present results help to explain and specify some of the previously reported data 
(Paulus and Frank, 2006; Berns et al., 2008). Specifically, the current data suggest 
that probability distortions occur with rewarding outcomes and are not explained by 
attentional mechanisms. Berns et al. (2008) varied the probability of shock occurrence 
between p = 1/6 and p = 1 and found deviations from linear probability processing in 
visual, temporal, parietal, and frontal cortex, cingulate, insula and cerebellum. All of 
these activations were compatible with inverted S-shaped probability distortion. 
However, the exclusive testing with probabilities greater than zero prevented 
distinguishing inverted S-shaped from U-shaped distortions. U-shaped distortions 
would be more compatible with accounts proposing that reliable predictors of shock 
or no shock attract more attention than less reliable predictors (Mackintosh, 1975). 
The current tests with the full range of probabilities (from p = 0.0 to p = 1.0) revealed 
reward specific and differential encoding of fully inverted S and regular S-distortions 
in prefrontal regions that do not seem to be explained by attentional mechanisms. 
The presently observed probability distortions occurred in well-controlled 
behavioral situations with actually experienced outcomes and differed partly from 
those observed in situations using verbal descriptions of choices (Paulus and Frank 
2006). This distinction is important, as behavioral work has shown that we often 
underweigh experienced but overweigh described low probability outcomes, 
implicating regular S-distortions with experience and inverse S-distortions with 
description (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kareev et al., 2002; Barron and Erev, 
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Weber et al., 2004; Weber, 2006). In agreement with the 
notion of experience being an important factor in the representation of probability, the 
present findings revealed not only description-compatible inverted S-shaped but also 
regular S-shaped distortions and experience-induced changes in neuronal probability 
distortions. The findings demonstrate the usefulness of behavioral tests with actually 
experienced outcomes for investigating basic neural mechanisms underlying 
probabilistic decision-making. 
 
Relation to lesion studies 
The present results are in good agreement with previous lesion studies nd transcranial 
magnetic stimulation that implicate prefrontal cortex in the processing of probabilistic 
outcomes (Bechara et al., 2000; Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Clark et al., 2004; Hornak 
et al., 2004; Fellows and Farah, 2005; Knoch, et al., 2006; Floden et al., 2008). 
Prefrontal lesions change risk-related behavior when patients repeatedly make 
decisions with probabilistic reward (Bechara et al., 2000; Clark et al., 2004; Floden et 
al., 2008). Conceivably, prefrontal lesions affect risk-related behavior by altering the 
coding of reward probability. Gambling behavior may become more prevalent with 
ventral prefrontal lesions because the experience-conforming underweighting of small 
probabilities no longer influences behavior. 
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